[Field survey: 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM]

1. Nomura Dam

・The state of the dam lake

・How to manage the property within the management office

- The discharged water flows downstream with a significant drop in elevation

2. Confirmation of the actions of the deceased on the day of death

Can you see the river from your house?

・If you run, you can evacuate in just a few minutes.

- How they escaped by climbing onto someone else's roof

- Regarding the couple who died, the distance from the river and the fact that their house was built lower than the surrounding area

[Examination of the plaintiff who lost her husband]
・I was woken up by an announcement saying, "The water level has reached a dangerous level that could lead to flooding." I went to see the river with my late husband. The water level had not risen. I wondered why they had made such an announcement.

・I left for work and called my husband, and the last thing I heard was, "Evacuate, evacuate."

-I had heard that in previous floods, the levee would overflow at around 800 m3/s, so if I had been informed that the discharge rate would be 1,750 m3/s, I would have evacuated early instead of going to work.

[Testimony from the plaintiff who lost her mother]

-I live at the foot of the bridge and look at the river and see that the water level is not rising.

・Thinking that the flooding would be limited to the basement, I moved my belongings to a place about 1.5 meters higher. After that, I planned to evacuate with my mother, but by the time I finished moving them, the flooding had already begun, and the water level had risen so rapidly that I was unable to move in my car, so I climbed onto the roof of someone else's house.

-The mother called her son to ask for help, but when he tried to go and help her, he was almost swept away by the muddy water and was unable to do so.

-I had heard that the discharge rate would exceed the levee at 800 m3/s, so if they had informed me that the discharge rate would be 1,750 m3/s, I would have stopped lifting the goods, which would have been a waste of time, and taken my mother to evacuate early.

[Chief of Ozu City Crisis Management Division]

- Testimony that the mayor's message to residents was not good, so everyone worked together to come up with a plan, which took time.

Regarding the discharge volume and flooding damage to houses, testimony showed that houses in low-lying areas begin to flood when the discharge volume exceeds 800 m3/s.

-We acknowledge that the evacuation order was delayed because the decision was based on the water level of the Hijikawa River.

[Examination of the plaintiff who lost both parents]

I lived in Uwajima City, 50 km from the disaster site. My friend was worried, but I was telling him that my house was far from the river and that I was safe when I received a phone call from Seiyo City. He said that his parents had died, and when I asked which of them had died, he said both of them.

The dam was constructed in a way that allowed it to function properly.

-I am not aware of any operating rules that would prevent large-scale flooding.

- He stated that he was unaware of the special disaster prevention operations, even though they had been explained at a "public information meeting" hosted by Kanogawa Dam for related organizations.

・He testified that the dam office has no obligation to directly inform residents of dam discharge information, ignoring the operational rules. There were scenes where the government's designated representative panicked.

- We acknowledge that we were aware that Ozu City had not informed residents that the discharge volume would be the largest ever and that it would reach 6,000 m3/s, but that we did not directly inform residents of this.

- They did not answer questions about why they announced that the water level had reached a dangerous level that could cause flooding, even though it had not reached that level.

-When asked why they did not inform residents that water levels would rise rapidly once emergency flood prevention operations began, they answered that they did not want residents to panic.

- He admitted that he nearly gave up when he received the call at 6:08 a.m. saying, "1,750 tons, this is going to be a big problem."

・I didn't know what the 1,750 tons contained, but I didn't ask anyone around me who knew.

-In response to a question from the judge, the defendant stated that the head of the fire department was nearby and that the fire department had withdrawn from the area near the embankment at 6:30.

-I am not aware of any operating rules that would prevent large-scale flooding.

 - He repeatedly testified that he had received a phone call at 4:30 a.m. informing people that disaster prevention operations in the event of an abnormal flood would begin at 6:20 a.m., which contradicts the fax sent at 4:30 a.m.

 - They say they can only operate in accordance with the operating rules, but they have not given clear testimony about the prohibition of sudden releases.

We are now about to begin the examination of witnesses. Please come and observe.

Wednesday, August 27th: Witness testimony: Former Nomura Dam Office Director to appear in court from 10am to 4pm

Thursday, August 28th: Witness examination: Seiyo City Former Nomura Branch Chief will appear in court from 10am to 4pm

9/18 (Thu) Witness examination: Former Kanogawa Dam office manager will appear in court from 10:00 to 16:00

9/19 (Fri) Witness examination: Ozu City Court appearance 10:00-16:00

10/8 (Wednesday) 2 plaintiffs 10:00-16:00

10/9 (Thu) Reserve day

肱川水害から5年　訴訟で明らかになった国、西予市、大洲市の過失

13:10 - Consultation between the defense team, the court, and the defendant.

13:45 - March begins 　

Today's slogan was, "The Kanto Regional Development Bureau and Kyushu Regional Development Bureau are flexibly implementing emergency discharge avoidance operations. Why didn't the Nomura Dam and Kano River Dam do the same? Why did the Nomura Dam office overlook the water level of the Gokase River flood prediction system?"

Next time, we plan to submit an opinion statement from scholars.

In this trial, PowerPoint was used to highlight the following points: "According to the Gokase River flood prediction system, the Nomura Dam office should have informed Niihama City of the abnormal flood control operation start one hour before at 5:20 AM, but due to overlooking the water level data of the Gokase River flood prediction system, they notified one hour before the abnormal flood control operation start from 5:50 AM to 6:50 AM and started the abnormal flood control operation at 6:20 AM without prior notice when it was almost full. In contrast, dam offices of the Kanto Regional Development Bureau and Kyushu Regional Development Bureau operate flexibly to avoid abnormal flood control operations and have a different stance in preventing water damage. ”

Attached is the PowerPoint presentation. For more details, please refer to Plaintiff's Preparation Document 16.

At 2:45 PM, an explanatory session was held for plaintiffs, supporters, and the media at the Ehime Bar Association building. Supporters from Miyagi Prefecture also joined this time.

Please refer to NHK's broadcast on September 6 for additional information: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/matsuyama-news/20230906/8000016745.html

The next scheduled date is December 15th (Friday) at 2:00 PM.

The defendant country only partially responded to the clarification.

As expected, the interpretation of the operating rules, which the court strongly urged for clarification, was clarified. As for whether or not the old regulations could have avoided disaster prevention operations during abnormal floods, it has refused to answer as it is not necessary to answer.

The defendant country seems to want to get away with the issue of the flaws in the operation rules, not the flaws (negligence) in the discharge operation of the dam director, and that it is within the framework of the Supreme Court decision in the Daito flood lawsuit. However, the defect in the operating rules this time is not due to technical or financial constraints, but rather to changing appropriate operating rules to inappropriate operating rules that are not useful in preventing flood damage. should be treated as outside the framework of

Defendant Seiyoichi's objection (deception?)

The plaintiff did not say to inform the residents of the figure of 1750 tons per second, but the plaintiff said, ``In the meaning of this discharge amount, it is extremely dangerous to stay inside the house and encourage evacuation. .” Despite this, Seiyo City is making the excuse that residents do not understand even if they tell them the figure of 1,750 tons per second.

Seiyo also claims that 98% of its residents have evacuated as evidence that their information provision was sufficient. However, it is only natural for people inside the house to evacuate when the house is about to be swallowed up by the discharge. If the evacuation order of Seiyo City is properly conveyed, the fire brigade will be issuing instructions from 5:10 am, so many residents must be at the evacuation center by 6 am. The fact that most people had not evacuated to evacuation centers at 6:00 a.m. shows that the evacuation order in Seiyo City was extremely inadequate.

* A new lawsuit was filed by the bereaved family against Seiyo City, and the statement was also made and merged.

The bereaved family was worried and called their mother the day before the flood. The deceased mother replied that the water level in the river had not increased, and said that she wondered, "Why didn't the dam be prepared by releasing water into the dam?"