13:10 - Consultation between the defense team, the court, and the defendant.

13:45 - March begins 　

Today's slogan was, "The Kanto Regional Development Bureau and Kyushu Regional Development Bureau are flexibly implementing emergency discharge avoidance operations. Why didn't the Nomura Dam and Kano River Dam do the same? Why did the Nomura Dam office overlook the water level of the Gokase River flood prediction system?"

Next time, we plan to submit an opinion statement from scholars.

In this trial, PowerPoint was used to highlight the following points: "According to the Gokase River flood prediction system, the Nomura Dam office should have informed Niihama City of the abnormal flood control operation start one hour before at 5:20 AM, but due to overlooking the water level data of the Gokase River flood prediction system, they notified one hour before the abnormal flood control operation start from 5:50 AM to 6:50 AM and started the abnormal flood control operation at 6:20 AM without prior notice when it was almost full. In contrast, dam offices of the Kanto Regional Development Bureau and Kyushu Regional Development Bureau operate flexibly to avoid abnormal flood control operations and have a different stance in preventing water damage. ”

Attached is the PowerPoint presentation. For more details, please refer to Plaintiff's Preparation Document 16.

At 2:45 PM, an explanatory session was held for plaintiffs, supporters, and the media at the Ehime Bar Association building. Supporters from Miyagi Prefecture also joined this time.

Please refer to NHK's broadcast on September 6 for additional information: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/matsuyama-news/20230906/8000016745.html

The next scheduled date is December 15th (Friday) at 2:00 PM.

The defendant country only partially responded to the clarification.

As expected, the interpretation of the operating rules, which the court strongly urged for clarification, was clarified. As for whether or not the old regulations could have avoided disaster prevention operations during abnormal floods, it has refused to answer as it is not necessary to answer.

The defendant country seems to want to get away with the issue of the flaws in the operation rules, not the flaws (negligence) in the discharge operation of the dam director, and that it is within the framework of the Supreme Court decision in the Daito flood lawsuit. However, the defect in the operating rules this time is not due to technical or financial constraints, but rather to changing appropriate operating rules to inappropriate operating rules that are not useful in preventing flood damage. should be treated as outside the framework of

Defendant Seiyoichi's objection (deception?)

The plaintiff did not say to inform the residents of the figure of 1750 tons per second, but the plaintiff said, ``In the meaning of this discharge amount, it is extremely dangerous to stay inside the house and encourage evacuation. .” Despite this, Seiyo City is making the excuse that residents do not understand even if they tell them the figure of 1,750 tons per second.

Seiyo also claims that 98% of its residents have evacuated as evidence that their information provision was sufficient. However, it is only natural for people inside the house to evacuate when the house is about to be swallowed up by the discharge. If the evacuation order of Seiyo City is properly conveyed, the fire brigade will be issuing instructions from 5:10 am, so many residents must be at the evacuation center by 6 am. The fact that most people had not evacuated to evacuation centers at 6:00 a.m. shows that the evacuation order in Seiyo City was extremely inadequate.

* A new lawsuit was filed by the bereaved family against Seiyo City, and the statement was also made and merged.

The bereaved family was worried and called their mother the day before the flood. The deceased mother replied that the water level in the river had not increased, and said that she wondered, "Why didn't the dam be prepared by releasing water into the dam?"

Statement of opinion

I run a tatami shop at the foot of Mishima Bridge.

On July 7, 2018, on the morning of heavy rain in western Japan, I was worried about the state of the river from the dim light, but the water level did not rise so much.

The discharges I've seen so far have been in a state where the volume of water has increased little by little, so I didn't expect the water level to rise so suddenly.

After the disaster, I learned that a particularly dangerous operation called disaster prevention operation during an abnormal flood was performed.

We believed in the safety myth that it's okay because there is a dam, and we came to that day without being informed that there was such a dangerous operation.

Soaking up to my heart, my wife and I fled to a nearby house with two of our neighbors who were late to escape and went upstairs. Still, the amount of water increased, so I managed to crawl up to the top of the roof.

As the surrounding houses were washed away, I was worried about when they would be washed away.

I was able to contact my mother during the evacuation, but I was very worried because the phone was cut off immediately.

I was hoping that he would escape to the second floor of the next warehouse, but unfortunately he died.

My wife thought, "I was telling you to take me, so my mother didn't move and waited at home and died." I will.

Do I have to continue to live with this kind of thought?

Is it our responsibility that my mother died? Was we wrong? Or is it responsible for the national release method and information transmission? I would like the court to make a decision.

Please make a correct decision.

The Nomura Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on September 9, and the first trial was held at the Matsuyama District Court on November 25.

Representative Irie made a statement.